

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 2, 1949

Dear Admiral Hillenkoetter:

We have taken up with the Director of the NSC-43 program the request for an Estimate of Psychological Factors and the proposal for a Psychological Warfare Intelligence Committee which you presented in your memorandum of 15 June. As you indicate, both matters are closely related to the NSC-43 program, and we welcome the opportunity they offer to develop and implement some of the basic procedures in the relation of intelligence to that program.

The State Department feels that the coordination of intelligence production in support of planning for psychological warfare might profitably proceed in close connection with the actual planning of psychological warfare intelligence organization. The Director of the NSC-43 program, therefore, suggests that under the joint staff of the NSC-43 organization there be established an intelligence sub-committee, with representation from all IAC agencies, which shall not only plan on intelligence matters for the NSC-43 joint staff, but also, being inter-departmental in character, coordinate the allocation of intelligence production in support of such planning. Upon recommendation of this sub-committee, the Director would then call upon appropriate agencies for intelligence contributions, which would, of course, including turning to the CIA for all necessary national intelligence under the customary procedures for requesting national intelligence estimates. As we understand it, implementation of this proposal would fill the gap which you perceived in the apparatus for psychological warfare planning, and would eliminate need for the committee you suggest by tying the procedure in functionally with the NSC-43 program.

In view of the NSC-43 program and its current development, the State Department now feels that the subject request for an Estimate might well be put into the established machinery. The scope and importance of the project are good

Rear Admiral R. H. Hillenkoetter  
Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington 25, D.C.

DOS, JCS reviews completed




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reasons for applying to it the full benefit of the coordinating procedures of the program. We suggest, therefore, that the Joint Intelligence Committee might be willing to withdraw and direct the same proposal through channels to the Director of the NSC-43 organization.

In response to your request that the State Department designate officials who could discuss these problems with a representative of your agency, we designate Mr. Frederick C. Oechsner and Mr. Allan Evans, who will be glad to develop these points further with any representatives you may name.

Sincerely yours,

  
W. Park Armstrong, Jr.



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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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JIGM-111  
12 May 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

(Thru:  CIA Representative with JCS)

Subject: Estimate of Psychological Factors

Enclosure: PM-888, 2 May 1949 (4 copies) (J.I.C. 457/M)

1. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee has requested that the Joint Intelligence Committee furnish it with an estimate of Psychological factors that can be used as a basis for psychological warfare planning.

2. In order to insure that consonant intelligence may be used for the peacetime information program and the planning for psychological warfare in the time of war, it is considered desirable that the Central Intelligence Agency coordinate the assembly of the necessary intelligence.

3. Therefore, it is requested that the Central Intelligence Agency, calling upon such other agencies as may be necessary, furnish the Joint Intelligence Group with the psychological factors to be used as a basis for preparation of the estimate. The Enclosure hereto outlines the information that is desired by the JIG. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of the Enclosure. It is desired that comments be made on the value of each factor for the dates set forth as well as the present.

4. In connection with the factors listed under paragraph 2 1, 1, and k of the Enclosure, it is requested that Soviet capabilities for the waging of psychological warfare during wartime be indicated.

C. R. PECK  
Secretary

CC: D/I, GSUSA  
D/I, USAF  
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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE  
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

FM-333  
2 May 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Estimate of Psychological Factors.

1. The Joint Strategic Plans Committee requests that the Joint Intelligence Committee furnish it with an estimate of psychological factors that can be used as a basis for psychological warfare planning in connection with the USSR, her satellites, Soviet occupied countries, and countries liable to be over-run by enemy forces in the event of war.

2. It is requested that the following psychological factors be included in the response to this request:

a. Psychological strengths and weaknesses including points of cohesion and division, and probable reactions to internal and external conditions and events of:

- (1) Military Structures.
- (2) Social Structures.
- (3) Political Groups.
- (4) Social-Economic Classes.
- (5) Governments.
- (6) Racial and Ethnic Groups.
- (7) Nationalities.
- (8) National Customs.
- (9) Religious Groups.
- (10) Language and Dialect Groups.
- (11) Labor Organizations.

b. The stresses that can be expected to appear just prior to and during a war.

c. Psychological vulnerabilities which we could profitably exploit, together with the modifying factors and the counter measures which we could expect. Examples are:

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- (1) Communists versus non-Communists.
- (2) Urban versus rural areas.
- (3) Leaders versus the masses.
- (4) Military dissatisfaction with political control.
- (5) The effect of the terror apparatus (MVD, KGB, and forced labor camps).
- (6) Government versus dissident elements.
- (7) Dissatisfaction with economic conditions.
- (8) Differences between the USSR and her satellites.
- (9) Desire of the people for peace.

d. The receptivity of our anticipated audience.

e. Quantitative estimates of radio receivers and frequency band distribution.

f. The ability of target populations to understand oral and written propaganda.

g. The probable effectiveness of enemy governments efforts to limit reception of U.S. propaganda; counter measures to be expected.

h. Conclusions as to the probable relative degree of success of various psychological warfare media.

i. The probable psychological warfare aims and objectives of the enemy during wartime.

j. The media which the enemy will probably exploit in carrying out their psychological warfare.

k. Information covering the propaganda systems presently in use by the USSR, and deviations to be expected in war time.

l. The probable psychological effects of the A-bomb, particularly as to:

- (1) The rapidity with which knowledge of A-bomb attack will be disseminated within the USSR orbit.
- (2) The reaction if formal and timely notice of intention to bomb localities without mention of specific targets is furnished by us.
- (3) The psychological effect of destroying historically and culturally-significant locations.
- (4) The United States and her allies using A-bombs prior to the time that the USSR has them.
- (5) The USSR has A-bombs and has unsuccessfully proposed outlawing them, but the United States is the first to use them.
- (6) Factors to be considered concerning the relationship between the A-bomb target system and the psychological warfare campaign.



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m. Any negative factors which must be considered.

3. It is requested that the periods of time be divided into:

a. The present.

b. The period of about 1952.

c. The period of about 1956.

4. Psychological warfare is defined as "The planned use, by a nation, in time of war or threat of war, of propaganda and related informational measures designed to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of enemy, neutral or friendly foreign groups in such a way as to support the accomplishment of its national policy and aims."

FOR THE JOINT STRATEGIC PLANS COMMITTEE:

/sgd./  
C. C. McFARLANE.

Secretary

Copy to:

Rear Admiral C. D. Glover, USN  
Rear Admiral W. F. Boone, USN  
Brig. General C. V. R. Smyler, USA  
Colonel J. B. Cary, USAF

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